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Introduction	  	  	  	  Both	  sides	  of	  the	  immigration	  debate	  agree	  that	  our	  Southwest	  border	  is	  “broken,”	  but	  they	  have	  very	  different	  views	  as	  to	  why	  or	  how	  to	  fix	  it.	  On	  one	  side,	  immigration	  reform	  advocates	  point	  to	  a	  broken	  immigration	  system	  that	  forces	  immigrants	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  increasingly	  violent	  smugglers	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  trip	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  seeks	  to	  improve	  border	  security	  by	  taking	  border	  crossers	  who	  seek	  legitimate	  work	  out	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  unauthorized	  immigrants.	  But	  the	  opponents	  of	  immigration	  reform	  argue	  that	  we	  can’t	  act	  on	  reform	  until	  we	  first	  “secure	  the	  border.”	  The	  Obama	  Administration	  seems	  to	  have	  accepted	  this	  argument,	  ramping	  up	  spending	  on	  border	  enforcement	  and	  deporting	  record	  numbers	  as	  a	  down	  payment	  on	  immigration	  reform	  at	  some	  unspecified	  time	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  	  As	  the	  Attorney	  General	  of	  Arizona,	  I	  was	  part	  of	  law	  enforcement	  on	  the	  southwestern	  border	  for	  most	  of	  the	  past	  decade.	  My	  office	  confronted	  border	  crime	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis.	  From	  that	  view,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  much	  of	  the	  “secure	  the	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border”	  debate	  is	  nonsense.	  Again	  and	  again,	  symbols	  trumped	  reality,	  misinformation	  buried	  the	  truth.	  Programs	  like	  building	  a	  bigger	  border	  wall	  or	  enlisting	  police	  in	  the	  local	  enforcement	  of	  immigration	  laws	  were	  sold	  as	  ways	  to	  make	  the	  border	  more	  secure.	  They	  will	  not.	  In	  the	  latter	  instance,	  the	  “cure”	  could	  actually	  make	  the	  crime	  problem	  worse.	  Equally	  misguided	  was	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  force	  buildup	  alone	  would	  keep	  the	  border	  secure	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  smuggling	  organizations	  —	  the	  cartels.	  	  	  	  Since	  improved	  border	  security	  is	  a	  common	  denominator	  in	  the	  immigration	  debate,	  both	  sides	  should	  be	  anxious	  to	  know	  what	  actually	  works.	  This	  paper	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  sincere	  parties	  on	  both	  sides	  want	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  symbols.	  I	  believe	  a	  more	  effective	  border	  defense	  is	  possible,	  but	  not	  on	  the	  present	  course.	  Not	  by	  the	  Administration’s	  defense-­‐only	  buildup	  of	  Border	  Patrol	  and	  National	  Guard	  on	  the	  border,	  and	  not	  by	  the	  huge	  investment	  in	  bricks	  and	  mortar	  or	  the	  quasi-­‐military	  responses	  proposed	  by	  the	  Administration’s	  critics.	  	  	  	  A	  more	  effective	  border	  strategy	  starts	  with	  the	  money;	  the	  torrent	  of	  cash	  pouring	  across	  the	  border	  into	  the	  drug	  cartel	  pocketbooks.	  The	  cartels	  are,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  business	  enterprises.1	  Sophisticated	  organizations	  are	  formed	  not	  for	  any	  lust	  for	  power	  or	  to	  employ	  the	  bosses’	  relatives,	  but	  because	  they	  maximize	  profits.	  Cartel	  agents	  do	  not	  threaten,	  terrorize,	  and	  kill	  because	  they	  love	  the	  work,	  or	  out	  of	  religious	  zeal.	  They	  do	  it	  because	  they	  are	  very	  well-­‐paid.	  So,	  go	  after	  the	  money.	  Taking	  away	  the	  profit	  cripples	  the	  organization.	  Conversely,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  money	  from	  drug	  sales	  and	  human	  smuggling	  —	  which	  may	  total	  more	  than	  $40	  billion	  a	  year2	  —	  flows	  to	  the	  cartels,	  the	  violence	  in	  Mexico,	  the	  sophisticated	  smugglers	  crossing	  our	  border,	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  nothing	  is	  being	  done	  to	  defend	  the	  border	  will	  continue.	  	  	  	  We	  can	  also	  do	  a	  much	  better	  job	  of	  taking	  the	  fight	  directly	  to	  the	  drug	  cartels	  using	  the	  full	  arsenal	  of	  law-­‐enforcement	  methods.	  We	  can	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  illegal	  crossers	  and	  the	  amounts	  of	  illegal	  drugs	  smuggled,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  violence	  in	  Mexico.	  The	  answers	  are	  straightforward;	  the	  mystery	  is	  why	  they	  have	  not	  been	  taken	  up	  long	  ago.	  	  	  	  
How	  Do	  We	  Define	  “Success”?	  	  	  	  We	  in	  Arizona	  know	  something	  about	  border	  problems.	  Roughly	  380	  miles	  of	  the	  2,000-­‐mile	  border	  with	  Mexico	  are	  in	  our	  state.	  The	  most	  rugged	  terrain	  of	  the	  whole	  2,000	  miles	  is	  in	  the	  Tucson	  Sector	  of	  the	  Border	  Patrol.	  With	  intensified	  border	  enforcement	  in	  California	  and	  most	  of	  Texas,	  Arizona	  has	  become	  the	  primary	  corridor	  for	  the	  smuggling	  of	  drugs,	  guns,	  money,	  and	  people.	  In	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  Arizona	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  poster	  child	  for	  ineffective	  border	  defenses.	  	  	  	  
From	  my	  first	  days	  as	  Arizona’s	  Attorney	  General,	  I	  found	  it	  astonishing	  and	  frustrating	  that,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  huge	  smuggling	  problem,	  many	  of	  the	  steps	  law	  enforcement	  would	  normally	  take	  to	  fight	  crime,	  especially	  organized	  crime,	  were	  not	  being	  taken.	  Before	  spending	  billions	  on	  border	  security,	  my	  law-­‐enforcement	  colleagues	  would	  first	  identify	  what	  threat	  is	  being	  defended	  against,	  decide	  how	  best	  to	  confront	  that	  threat,	  and	  estimate	  how	  much	  effort	  is	  needed	  to	  succeed.	  They	  would	  set	  clear	  goals	  so	  they	  could	  tell	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  strategy	  is	  successful.	  In	  short,	  before	  setting	  up	  a	  border	  defense,	  they	  would	  heed	  the	  words	  of	  Robert	  Frost’s	  poem,	  Mending	  Wall,	  and	  determine	  exactly	  “What	  I	  was	  walling	  in	  or	  walling	  out...”	  	  	  	  That	  has	  not	  happened.	  A	  clear	  objective	  —	  a	  precise	  statement	  of	  what	  we	  are	  walling	  out	  —	  was	  the	  first	  casualty	  in	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  border	  security	  buildup.	  It	  is	  often	  stated	  that	  our	  border	  security	  response	  is	  “risk	  based.”	  But	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  what	  risk	  is	  being	  guarded	  against.	  What	  started	  as	  a	  mission	  to	  prevent	  terrorists	  from	  entering	  the	  country	  has	  morphed	  into	  preventing	  all	  illegal	  crossers	  from	  entering,	  including	  the	  thousands	  seeking	  work.	  Then	  it	  became	  a	  fight	  against	  drug	  smuggling	  by	  the	  international	  cartels,	  and	  —	  most	  recently	  —	  an	  effort	  to	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  violence	  from	  Mexico.	  	  	  	  What	  is	  appropriate	  border	  strategy	  depends	  on	  the	  threat	  we	  are	  fighting.	  The	  tactics	  and	  strategies	  to	  confront	  one	  threat	  may	  not	  work	  against	  others.	  No	  defense	  can	  be	  effective	  against	  every	  threat	  simultaneously.	  But,	  since	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  has	  been	  unwilling	  to	  state	  exactly	  what	  threat	  it	  is	  defending	  against,	  critics	  have	  enjoyed	  a	  field	  day	  decrying	  each	  Administration	  action	  as	  a	  “failure,”	  without	  having	  to	  be	  specific	  themselves.	  In	  2010	  and	  2011,	  every	  Administration	  border	  announcement	  was	  greeted	  by	  a	  chorus	  of	  “it’s	  not	  enough.”3	  But	  no	  one	  asked	  the	  obvious	  question,	  “enough	  to	  do	  what?”	  The	  Administration	  protests,	  rightly,	  that	  the	  goal	  posts	  are	  continually	  being	  moved,	  yet	  they	  do	  not	  define	  where	  those	  posts	  should	  be.	  	  	  	  Much	  of	  this	  country	  and	  Congress	  have	  been	  viewing	  with	  increasing	  concern	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  organized	  criminal	  organizations	  that	  smuggle	  massive	  amounts	  of	  drugs	  and	  people	  into	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  guns	  and	  money	  into	  Mexico.	  Despite	  the	  significant	  buildup	  of	  U.S.	  border	  defenses	  and	  the	  courageous	  efforts	  of	  the	  Calderón	  Administration,	  the	  drug	  cartels	  have	  been	  spectacularly	  successful	  in	  their	  cross-­‐border	  criminal	  activities	  and	  have	  taken	  over	  much	  of	  the	  civil	  authority	  in	  parts	  of	  Mexico.	  Their	  obvious	  successes	  moving	  contraband	  across	  the	  border	  gives	  added	  credibility	  to	  “broken	  border”	  proclamations.	  	  	  	  Many	  Americans	  also	  have	  become	  concerned,	  bordering	  on	  hysterical,	  about	  the	  wave	  of	  cartel-­‐related	  violence	  in	  Mexico.	  This	  is	  no	  fear	  of	  phantoms.	  An	  estimated	  60,000	  people	  have	  died	  since	  President	  Calderón	  began	  an	  all-­‐out	  assault	  on	  the	  drug	  cartels	  over	  five	  years	  ago.4	  Some	  killings	  have	  been	  singularly	  gruesome,	  with	  victim	  beheadings	  a	  cartel	  signature.	  Although	  the	  north	  side	  of	  the	  border	  has	  
remained	  relatively	  safe,	  many	  in	  this	  country	  are	  convinced	  that	  the	  violence	  is	  already	  sweeping	  into	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	  Without	  agreed-­‐upon	  indicators	  to	  measure	  border-­‐enforcement	  efforts,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  whether	  they	  are	  succeeding	  or	  failing.	  The	  Obama	  Administration	  makes	  fulsome	  claims	  that	  they	  are	  creating	  a	  “21st	  Century	  Border,”5	  but	  what	  does	  that	  mean?	  Presumably,	  a	  21st	  Century	  Border	  is	  one	  that	  keeps	  criminals	  out,	  while	  permitting	  the	  vigorous	  flow	  of	  legitimate	  commerce.	  Unfortunately,	  according	  to	  many	  long-­‐time	  border	  residents,	  the	  tactics	  being	  used	  today	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  They	  disrupt	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  destroy	  commerce,	  while	  the	  effect	  on	  criminal	  activity	  is	  negligible.	  	  	  	  Since	  no	  terrorists	  have	  been	  apprehended	  on	  the	  southwest	  border,	  our	  border-­‐security	  efforts	  against	  the	  terrorist	  threat	  are	  either	  a	  total	  success	  or	  a	  total	  failure.	  Either	  border	  defenses	  missed	  every	  terrorist	  or	  deterred	  them	  all!	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  attribute	  the	  continued	  decline	  in	  the	  street	  prices	  for	  marijuana,	  heroin,	  cocaine,	  and	  meth	  to	  the	  current	  border-­‐enforcement	  effort,	  since	  efforts	  to	  choke	  off	  the	  flow	  of	  illegal	  drugs	  have	  been	  failing	  for	  decades.	  Perhaps	  the	  greatest	  border	  success	  has	  been	  the	  low	  rate	  of	  violent	  crime	  on	  the	  U.S.	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  However,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  crime	  suppression	  in	  border	  communities	  has	  never	  been	  a	  declared	  border	  goal,	  and	  no	  one	  gives	  Homeland	  Security	  credit	  for	  it	  anyway.	  In	  fact,	  many	  Americans	  believe	  that	  the	  border	  region	  has	  become	  a	  free-­‐fire	  zone.	  	  	  	  DHS	  has	  proclaimed	  that	  its	  border-­‐security	  efforts	  are	  successful	  because	  fewer	  illegal	  crossers	  are	  being	  caught.	  I	  will	  put	  aside	  the	  apparent	  illogic	  that	  the	  huge	  buildup	  of	  forces	  and	  technology	  has	  produced	  fewer	  arrests.	  Before	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  illegal	  crossers	  arrested	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  valid	  indicator	  of	  success,	  DHS	  must	  prove	  that	  there	  were	  fewer	  actual	  attempts	  to	  cross	  illegally,	  that	  those	  who	  attempted	  the	  trip	  were	  not	  just	  better	  at	  avoiding	  apprehension.	  An	  impossible	  task.	  We	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  reduced	  number	  of	  jobs	  available	  to	  immigrants	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  Mexican	  economy,	  before	  accepting	  the	  decline	  in	  arrests	  as	  proof	  of	  effective	  deterrence.	  	  	  	  More	  fundamentally,	  when	  did	  the	  number	  of	  illegal	  crossers	  arrested	  become	  the	  best	  indicator	  of	  border	  success?	  The	  view	  from	  Arizona	  is	  that	  the	  illegal	  crossers	  are	  a	  symptom	  of	  a	  much	  more	  serious	  disease,	  not	  the	  disease	  itself.	  Most	  people	  would	  never	  attempt	  to	  cross	  the	  treacherous	  desert	  in	  the	  Tucson	  Sector	  of	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  without	  criminal	  assistance.	  The	  sophisticated	  network	  of	  scouts,	  drivers,	  guards,	  drop	  houses,	  transportation	  equipment,	  and	  intelligence	  gatherers	  who	  monitor	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  and	  other	  law-­‐enforcement	  agents	  are	  what	  make	  movement	  across	  the	  border	  possible.	  If	  anyone	  tries	  to	  cross	  the	  Arizona	  border	  without	  the	  help	  of	  a	  criminal	  enterprise,	  they	  will	  be	  quickly	  arrested	  or	  join	  the	  hundreds	  who	  have	  perished	  in	  that	  parched	  and	  treacherous	  desert.	  In	  short,	  without	  the	  legions	  of	  cartel	  agents	  and	  subcontractors	  who	  service	  every	  mile	  of	  
the	  route	  across	  the	  border	  and	  into	  destinations	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  illegal	  entry	  becomes	  far	  more	  difficult	  —	  or	  impossible.	  	  	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  crossers,	  but	  the	  criminal	  organizations	  that	  make	  their	  crossing	  possible.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  heightened	  border	  enforcement	  and	  treacherous	  terrain,	  they	  get	  their	  “cargo”	  across	  the	  border.	  The	  arrest	  and	  deportation	  of	  those	  who	  make	  it	  across	  simply	  gives	  the	  cartels	  more	  customers.	  Heightened	  border	  security	  means	  the	  cartels	  charge	  more	  for	  the	  trip.	  Plus,	  thousands	  of	  arrests	  give	  the	  false	  impression	  that	  something	  is	  being	  done	  to	  reduce	  border	  crimes.	  Whether	  arrests	  are	  up	  or	  down	  is	  inconsequential	  as	  long	  as	  the	  cartels	  are	  in	  operation.	  Until	  the	  cartels	  are	  eliminated,	  the	  border	  cannot	  be	  considered	  secure.	  Period.	  	  	  	  
Targeting	  the	  Cartels	  —	  and	  Their	  Money	  	  	  	  Any	  serious	  border	  defense	  must	  go	  after	  the	  cartel’s	  money,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  happening.	  Only	  recently	  have	  southbound,	  bulk	  cash	  shipments	  —	  shrink-­‐wrapped	  bales	  of	  $100	  bills	  —	  been	  seized	  by	  DHS	  in	  any	  quantity.	  But,	  the	  spectacular	  seizures	  reported	  are	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  bucket	  of	  cross-­‐border	  transfers.	  The	  main	  culprit	  is	  not	  DHS	  or	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice;	  it	  is	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury.	  Treasury	  officials	  who	  observe	  and	  regulate	  the	  international	  movement	  of	  currency	  remain	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  go	  after	  billions	  of	  dollars	  being	  laundered	  across	  the	  Mexican	  border.	  For	  years,	  they	  ignored	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  that	  were	  wire	  transferred	  to	  pay	  for	  human	  smuggling	  in	  Arizona.	  In	  spite	  of	  concerns	  raised	  by	  Congress,	  “stored	  value	  instruments”	  can	  still	  be	  taken	  across	  the	  border	  regardless	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  stored	  on	  them.6	  Moreover,	  “funnel”	  accounts	  in	  major	  banks	  have	  moved	  billions	  of	  dollars	  illegally	  across	  the	  border.	  Yet	  when	  money-­‐smuggling	  crimes	  have	  been	  uncovered,	  the	  perpetrators	  walk	  with	  no	  criminal	  penalties.	  Apparently,	  in	  Treasury’s	  view,	  allowing	  billions	  of	  dollars	  to	  flow	  into	  the	  cartel	  bank	  accounts	  is	  merely	  a	  technical	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  and	  not	  a	  deadly	  serious	  enterprise	  affecting	  the	  lives	  of	  millions	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border.	  	  	  	  By	  not	  stopping	  the	  money	  from	  illegal	  enterprises	  flowing	  across	  the	  border,	  one	  thing	  is	  sure;	  the	  cartels	  will	  continue	  to	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  attack	  the	  border	  successfully.	  By	  not	  moving	  aggressively	  against	  illegal	  money	  transfers	  across	  the	  border,	  this	  country	  is	  literally	  providing	  our	  enemies	  the	  resources	  to	  continue	  operating	  at	  a	  level	  of	  organizational	  and	  technological	  sophistication	  that	  is	  almost	  unstoppable.	  	  	  	  As	  Arizona’s	  Attorney	  General,	  I	  focused	  on	  cartel	  money	  transfers.	  Rather	  than	  wait	  for	  federal	  action,	  Arizona	  established	  the	  most	  robust	  and	  innovative	  state	  program	  in	  the	  nation.	  We	  were	  successful	  in	  driving	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  of	  proceeds	  from	  illegal	  activity	  out	  of	  our	  state.	  Through	  extended	  litigation,	  I	  forced	  reforms	  in	  the	  wire	  transfer	  industry	  so	  that	  the	  virtually	  anonymous	  transactions,	  
which	  paid	  for	  much	  of	  the	  human	  smuggling	  in	  the	  past,	  are	  no	  longer	  available.	  One	  state	  acting	  alone	  did	  a	  lot.	  	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  cartels	  have	  the	  whole	  2,000-­‐mile	  border	  to	  pick	  on.	  They	  simply	  shifted	  their	  money	  laundering	  operations	  away	  from	  Arizona	  in	  response	  to	  our	  prosecutions.	  Human	  smuggling	  into	  this	  country	  continued.	  Now,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  our	  settlement	  with	  Western	  Union	  in	  February	  2010,	  the	  data	  on	  wire	  transfers	  along	  the	  entire	  southwest	  border	  is	  available	  to	  law	  enforcement.	  The	  Arizona	  successes	  can	  now	  be	  taken	  nationwide,	  if	  there	  is	  the	  will	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  July	  2010,	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  (GAO)	  recommended	  a	  careful	  study	  of	  what	  we	  did	  in	  Arizona	  for	  implementation	  by	  DHS.7	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  if	  the	  federal	  authorities	  will	  use	  this	  data	  treasure	  trove	  to	  uncover	  criminal	  operations	  along	  the	  border.8	  	  	  	  Trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  and	  black	  market	  peso	  exchanges	  appear	  to	  be	  on	  the	  increase.	  The	  cartels	  are	  subcontracting	  with	  a	  virtual	  cottage	  industry	  of	  money	  brokers	  in	  the	  U.S.	  —	  people	  who	  make	  the	  illegal	  movement	  of	  money	  resemble	  legitimate	  international	  transactions.	  Transfers	  are	  broken	  down	  or	  structured	  into	  many	  accounts	  to	  evade	  suspicion	  from	  data	  analysts,	  and	  phony	  invoices	  are	  produced	  to	  make	  payments	  appear	  to	  be	  for	  legitimate	  goods	  or	  services.	  Failure	  to	  act	  means	  that	  every	  day	  the	  cartels	  are	  getting	  better	  and	  better	  at	  moving	  dollars	  out	  of	  the	  U.S.	  How	  long	  are	  we	  going	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  train	  in	  our	  backyard?	  	  	  	  
Going	  After	  the	  Cartel	  Bosses	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  disrupting	  the	  flow	  of	  cash,	  another	  law-­‐enforcement	  tactic	  that	  can	  be	  used	  more	  effectively	  on	  the	  border	  is	  targeting	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  criminal	  enterprises.	  When	  faced	  with	  sophisticated	  criminal	  organizations,	  law	  enforcement	  will	  attack	  the	  top	  of	  the	  organization	  with	  every	  means	  at	  its	  disposal.	  Every	  charge	  that	  will	  stick	  against	  the	  crime	  bosses	  will	  be	  used.	  It	  does	  little	  good	  to	  round	  up	  and	  imprison	  or	  deport	  the	  foot	  soldiers	  of	  the	  cartels.	  They	  are	  easily	  replaced	  with	  no	  damage	  to	  the	  organization.	  Yet	  most	  current	  efforts	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  small	  fries	  and	  subcontractors.	  The	  highly	  publicized	  immigrant	  sweeps	  splash	  on	  nightly	  news	  and	  give	  the	  appearance	  of	  being	  tough,	  but	  the	  impact	  is	  minimal.	  The	  smuggling	  of	  drugs	  and	  people	  over	  the	  southwest	  border	  will	  not	  be	  reduced	  until	  it	  becomes	  hazardous	  to	  manage	  the	  criminal	  enterprises.	  	  	  	  This	  country	  must	  break	  down	  the	  elaborate	  coordination	  required	  for	  successful	  smuggling.	  Arrest	  and	  incarceration	  of	  the	  bosses	  who	  coordinate	  the	  scouts,	  manage	  the	  money,	  and	  purchase	  the	  advanced	  technology	  will	  do	  just	  that.	  And	  we	  need	  to	  send	  a	  clear	  message	  that	  it	  will	  be	  extremely	  hazardous	  for	  anyone	  to	  take	  a	  fallen	  leader’s	  place.	  Such	  pressure,	  applied	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  cartel	  money	  is	  disrupted,	  will	  destroy	  the	  criminal	  organization.	  Without	  the	  organizations,	  the	  holes	  in	  our	  border	  defenses	  disappear.	  	  	  	  
In	  Arizona,	  my	  office	  never	  had	  any	  doubt	  that	  dismantling	  the	  criminal	  organizations	  was	  our	  primary	  objective.	  With	  our	  federal	  and	  local	  partners,	  we	  investigated	  and	  prosecuted	  multiple	  cartel	  operations	  in	  cash,	  human,	  gun,	  and	  drug	  smuggling.	  Whenever	  possible,	  we	  closed	  the	  operations	  down,	  soup	  to	  nuts.	  We	  arrested	  not	  just	  the	  easily	  replaceable	  foot	  soldiers	  and	  subcontractors,	  but	  the	  bosses.	  	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  such	  organization	  “take	  downs”	  take	  time,	  often	  years,	  to	  investigate	  and	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  nightly	  news.	  One	  state	  acting	  alone	  only	  has	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  U.S.	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  Going	  after	  the	  major	  cartel	  bosses	  in	  Mexico	  was	  beyond	  our	  power.	  Ultimately,	  going	  after	  the	  bosses	  will	  require	  federal	  leadership	  and	  close	  cooperation	  with	  the	  law	  enforcement	  of	  Mexico;	  something	  which	  has	  been	  slow	  to	  come	  together,	  and	  which	  no	  state	  operating	  alone	  can	  accomplish.	  Such	  a	  multinational	  effort	  will	  require	  a	  much	  closer	  working	  relationship	  with	  Mexican	  law	  enforcement	  than	  has	  been	  achieved	  so	  far.	  There	  has	  been	  progress	  in	  that	  effort,	  especially	  recently,	  but	  it	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  understand	  the	  protracted	  failure	  to	  engage	  in	  extensive	  common	  investigative	  efforts.	  	  	  	  Yes,	  there	  is	  still	  corruption	  among	  Mexican	  law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  chance,	  although	  much	  progress	  has	  been	  made,	  that	  some	  targets	  might	  be	  warned	  off	  and	  investigations	  frustrated.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  alternative?	  No	  one	  can	  doubt	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  people	  to	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  cartels.	  They	  have	  paid	  a	  huge	  price	  in	  blood	  for	  President	  Calderón’s	  attempt	  to	  destroy	  the	  criminal	  organizations.	  If	  anyone	  has	  earned	  our	  respect	  and	  deserves	  our	  support,	  it	  is	  Mexico.	  With	  the	  Merida	  Initiative,	  begun	  by	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  and	  continued	  under	  Obama,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  placed	  extensive	  technology	  and	  firepower	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government.	  The	  support	  in	  material	  and	  arms	  has	  undoubtedly	  helped.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  enough.	  	  	  	  The	  lack	  of	  bi-­‐national	  coordination,	  in	  effect,	  provides	  cartel	  leaders	  a	  sanctuary	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  Without	  much	  better	  coordination	  with	  Mexican	  law	  enforcement	  on	  the	  most	  important	  cases	  involving	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  cartels,	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  make	  a	  mockery	  of	  our	  border	  defenses.	  	  	  	  
Going	  on	  Offense	  	  	  	  So	  far,	  United	  States’	  border	  efforts	  have	  been	  basically	  defensive.	  We	  have	  made	  very	  significant	  investments	  in	  manpower	  and	  technology	  on	  our	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  But	  a	  team	  that	  only	  plays	  defense,	  however	  inspired,	  will	  lose.	  And,	  so	  will	  we.	  The	  legions	  of	  Border	  Patrol	  agents	  lined	  up	  along	  the	  north	  side	  of	  the	  border	  are	  sure	  to	  fail	  without	  the	  rest	  of	  a	  focused,	  multi-­‐faceted,	  anti-­‐crime	  package:	  stopping	  the	  flow	  of	  cartel	  money,	  going	  after	  the	  cartel	  leaders,	  and	  dismantling	  their	  criminal	  organizations.	  We	  could	  double	  again	  the	  number	  of	  Border	  Patrol	  agents	  and	  see	  little	  improvement.	  The	  cartels	  will	  continue	  to	  pick	  the	  weakest	  spots	  and	  bring	  their	  contraband,	  human	  and	  drug,	  across.	  It	  is	  time	  for	  a	  new	  game	  plan.	  	  
	  	  One	  goal	  which	  would	  give	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  whether	  we	  were	  succeeding	  or	  failing	  would	  be	  the	  arrest,	  prosecution,	  and	  incarceration	  of	  Chapo	  Guzman,	  the	  notorious	  leader	  of	  the	  Sinaloa	  cartel.	  Such	  a	  goal,	  clearly	  stated	  and	  unequivocal,	  would	  provide	  focus	  and	  accountability	  to	  the	  efforts	  and	  would	  force	  a	  close	  working	  relationship	  among	  law	  enforcement	  across	  the	  border.	  If	  U.S.	  forces	  can	  find	  Osama	  bin	  Laden,	  I	  am	  sure,	  with	  Mexican	  help,	  they	  can	  find	  and	  arrest	  Chapo.	  After	  all,	  Forbes	  magazine	  publishes	  his	  photograph	  in	  its	  annual	  edition	  on	  the	  world’s	  billionaires.	  That	  arrest	  would	  do	  more	  to	  stop	  the	  flow	  of	  contraband	  into	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  slaughter	  in	  Mexico	  than	  all	  the	  billions	  spent	  so	  far.	  With	  Chapo	  and	  other	  cartel	  leaders	  in	  custody	  awaiting	  trial,	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  could	  validly	  proclaim	  that	  it	  has	  made	  the	  border	  materially	  safer.	  	  	  	  Time	  is	  of	  the	  essence.	  The	  cartels	  are	  gaining	  significant	  authority	  within	  some	  areas	  in	  Mexico,	  and	  the	  Mexican	  people	  understandably	  tire	  of	  the	  bloodshed	  and	  cost	  of	  fighting	  them.	  I	  have	  little	  doubt	  that,	  when	  the	  Calderón	  Administration	  ends	  in	  December,	  Mexico’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  cartels	  will	  wane	  significantly.	  In	  addition,	  the	  cartels	  are	  rapidly	  diversifying	  into	  new	  lines	  of	  criminal	  activity,	  taking	  over	  the	  production	  and	  sale	  of	  pirated	  music	  CDs,	  videos,	  and	  software.	  They	  steal	  and	  distribute	  petroleum	  and	  hijack	  commercial	  trucks	  on	  an	  unprecedented	  scale.	  As	  they	  diversify,	  the	  cartels	  become	  harder	  and	  harder	  to	  isolate	  from	  the	  mainstream	  economy	  and	  harder	  to	  close	  down.	  	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  time	  for	  a	  maximum	  coordinated	  push.	  If	  leaders	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  serious	  about	  defending	  our	  border	  and	  not	  just	  using	  border	  failures	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  doing	  nothing	  on	  immigration	  reform,	  this	  country	  must	  become	  more	  than	  a	  glowering	  presence.	  Put	  the	  offensive	  team	  on	  the	  field	  and	  commit	  to	  finishing	  the	  job.	  Border	  defense	  is	  far	  more	  than	  just	  playing	  a	  deadly	  version	  of	  Red	  Rover.	  	  	  	  
Protecting	  the	  Ports	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  hysteria	  about	  border	  security	  is	  the	  buildup	  of	  the	  Border	  Patrol	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  customs	  enforcement.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  protecting	  the	  long	  stretches	  of	  remote	  border	  between	  the	  official	  crossings	  (or	  “ports”)	  has	  a	  price.	  With	  the	  de-­‐emphasis	  on	  customs	  inspections	  at	  the	  ports	  and	  the	  resulting	  strain	  on	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  (CBP),	  more	  contraband	  gets	  through	  the	  ports.	  	  	  	  Always	  opportunistic,	  the	  cartels	  have	  seen	  and	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  put	  more	  contraband	  through	  the	  ports	  of	  entry.	  Most	  of	  the	  criminal	  activity	  has	  shifted	  to	  the	  border	  crossings,	  not	  the	  places	  in	  between.	  Texas	  congressmen	  have	  become	  particularly	  concerned	  by	  this	  misallocation	  of	  resources.	  But,	  the	  popular	  demand	  is	  for	  beefing	  up	  enforcement,	  not	  better	  inspections.	  Moreover,	  low	  staffing	  at	  the	  ports	  has	  damaged	  legitimate	  cross-­‐border	  trade,	  with	  imported	  goods	  condemned	  to	  sit	  additional	  hours	  waiting	  to	  be	  inspected.	  By	  appearing	  tough	  —	  making	  
fortification	  of	  the	  border	  with	  additional	  Border	  Patrol	  the	  top	  priority,	  while	  deemphasizing	  the	  ports	  of	  entry	  —	  it	  is	  easier	  for	  the	  criminals	  to	  come	  through	  our	  front	  door.	  Once	  again,	  the	  symbol	  has	  trumped	  reality.	  	  	  	  	  A	  Changing	  Mexican	  Criminal	  Justice	  System	  	  
	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  waging	  an	  all-­‐out	  war	  against	  the	  cartels,	  Mexico	  has	  been	  quietly	  revolutionizing	  its	  justice	  system.	  Their	  current	  criminal	  trial	  procedures	  convict	  only	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  defendants.	  Trials	  are	  held	  behind	  closed	  doors	  using	  documentary	  evidence	  only,	  without	  confrontation	  of	  live	  witnesses,	  and	  are	  easily	  corrupted.	  For	  the	  assault	  on	  organized	  crime	  to	  succeed,	  Mexico	  recognized	  that	  it	  must	  adopt	  a	  more	  public	  prosecution	  system.	  The	  country	  is	  now	  transitioning	  to	  public	  trials	  and	  live	  confrontation	  of	  witnesses,	  similar	  to	  the	  U.S.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  massive	  undertaking	  to	  make	  such	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  normal	  times,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  cartel	  wars,	  with	  prosecutors’	  and	  judges’	  lives	  literally	  on	  the	  line,	  is	  nothing	  short	  of	  heroic.	  	  	  	  The	  new	  criminal	  justice	  system	  is	  being	  rolled	  out	  state	  by	  state	  across	  Mexico.	  Thousands	  of	  prosecutors	  and	  judges	  are	  being	  trained	  in	  an	  effort	  funded	  in	  large	  part	  by	  monies	  from	  the	  Merida	  Initiative.	  Training	  has	  been	  done	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice	  and	  state	  Attorneys	  General’s	  offices.	  Very	  quietly,	  this	  transformation	  of	  the	  Mexican	  criminal	  justice	  system	  has	  been	  a	  huge	  success,	  perhaps	  the	  brightest	  spot	  in	  the	  entire	  border	  defense.	  It	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  make	  huge	  differences	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  cartels,	  yet	  it	  has	  been	  largely	  unnoticed	  by	  the	  media	  and	  the	  border	  hawks.	  And,	  typical	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  coordination	  on	  the	  border,	  the	  most	  recent	  State	  Department	  budget	  cuts	  the	  training	  funds	  in	  half.	  Just	  when	  the	  new	  Mexican	  criminal	  justice	  system	  is	  poised	  to	  take	  flight,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  inexplicably	  cutting	  its	  wings.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  	  If	  the	  United	  States	  wants	  effective	  border	  security	  and	  not	  just	  a	  political	  punching	  bag,	  where	  symbolism	  trumps	  common	  sense,	  then	  more	  effective	  law-­‐enforcement	  measures	  must	  be	  taken.	  By	  attacking	  money	  laundering	  and	  making	  bi-­‐national	  criminal	  investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  the	  cartel	  bosses	  a	  priority,	  the	  border	  can	  be	  made	  significantly	  more	  secure.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  mayhem	  in	  Mexico	  and	  the	  smuggling	  of	  drugs	  and	  people	  into	  the	  United	  States	  will	  be	  reduced.	  There	  must	  be	  a	  unified	  focus.	  All	  agencies	  must	  get	  on	  the	  same	  page	  for	  the	  effort	  to	  succeed.	  State	  and	  local	  law	  enforcement,	  with	  the	  coordinated	  efforts	  of	  all	  relevant	  federal	  agencies,	  can	  win	  this.	  Nothing	  less	  will.	  	  	  	  Arizona	  can	  provide	  an	  instructive	  classroom	  for	  many	  of	  the	  procedures	  needed	  for	  success.	  We	  took	  the	  critical	  first	  steps	  in	  attacking	  the	  money	  laundering	  by	  human	  smugglers;	  we	  learned	  that	  trade	  through	  almost	  six	  years	  of	  trial	  and	  error.	  What	  is	  more,	  we	  developed	  excellent	  cross-­‐border	  relationships,	  personal	  and	  institutional,	  
and	  have	  —	  through	  the	  settlement	  with	  Western	  Union	  —	  unlocked	  a	  treasure	  trove	  of	  data	  relevant	  to	  illegal	  money	  transfers	  across	  the	  border.	  It	  is	  now	  up	  to	  the	  other	  states	  on	  the	  border,	  and	  federal	  officials,	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  lessons	  and	  mine	  the	  data	  bank	  for	  criminal	  leads.	  If	  that	  happens,	  we	  will	  take	  a	  long	  step	  toward	  eliminating	  the	  cartels.	  They	  are	  still	  flourishing	  today,	  precisely	  because	  one	  state	  working	  alone	  cannot	  make	  the	  comprehensive,	  bi-­‐national,	  border-­‐wide	  effort	  that	  is	  needed.	  Only	  the	  federal	  authorities	  can	  do	  that.	  	  	  	  However	  relevant	  my	  experience	  may	  be	  to	  the	  challenges	  of	  border	  security,	  I	  cannot	  influence	  those	  whose	  only	  mission	  is	  to	  find	  fault	  instead	  of	  workable	  solutions.	  Those	  whose	  real	  intent	  is	  not	  to	  fix	  the	  border,	  but	  to	  stop	  —	  and,	  if	  possible,	  reverse	  —	  all	  immigration	  into	  the	  United	  States.	  They	  will	  never	  be	  satisfied.	  However,	  to	  those	  who	  are	  seriously	  interested	  in	  results,	  for	  those	  who	  want	  to	  see	  a	  secure	  and	  commercially	  viable	  border	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Mexico,	  a	  real	  21st	  Century	  Border,	  my	  experience	  and	  the	  Arizona	  story	  can	  point	  the	  way.	  	  	  	  
Endnotes	  	  	  	  
1 Calling these criminal enterprises “drug cartels” is a misnomer. Unlike the 19th century industrial Robber 
Barons, they are vigorously, often viciously, competitive. Drug cartels are also rapidly moving away from a 
concentration on the production, smuggling, and distribution for sale of illegal drugs, using their organization 
and resources to diversify into other criminal activities, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and media 
piracy. Mexico has become the media piracy capital of Latin America, exporting so many illegal movies that 
the recording studios no longer try to sell their products in Central America. The rival cartels even brand their 
illegal products with their unique logos. They have also become a serious producer of illegal software, 
making thousands of copies of computer operating systems like Microsoft’s Windows XP. Drug cartels are 
more accurately called “transnational criminal organizations” (TCOs), but I will stick with the common 
denomination of “drug cartel,” or just “cartel.”  
2 This estimate is derived from U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009 National 
Drug Threat Assessment, December 2008, p. 49, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The 
Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 2010, p. 65.  
3 Arizona Governor Jan Brewer demanded 250 National Guardsmen at the beginning of the summer, but 
when the Administration promised twice that many, she did not hesitate to say the number was not nearly 
enough. See E. J. Montini, “Brewer got twice what she asked for,” The Arizona Republic, July 23, 2010.  
4 Mexican casualties in the cartel wars exceed the combined U.S. military losses in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
5 See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President 
Calderón of Mexico at Joint Press Conference,” March 3, 2011.  
6 Congress, as part of credit card reform, ordered Treasury to write regulations for stored value instruments 
by February 2009. They did not. When regulations were finally drafted in 2010, they failed to cover 
international movement of the cards. The final rule has been adopted, making some long overdue changes 
in how stored value instruments are reported and monitored, but still not closing the loophole in international 
money laundering by requiring them to be disclosed at the border.  
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling 
along the Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring Program Performance, 
GAO-­‐10-­‐919T, July 22, 2010, p. 6.  
8 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are showing interest 
in this data, although only a few prosecutions and a handful of arrests have been made.  
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